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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

;E---------------------------------------------------:ATE OF UTAH,

l,.

Plaintiff-Respondent,

1)H~

EARL McMILLAN,

Case No. 15654

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, JOHN EARL McMILLAN, appeals from convictions of
orcible Sodomy and Forcible Sexual Abuse rendered in the Third
istrict Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried before the Honorable Peter F. Leary
rithout a jury and the appellant was found guilty of the crime of
1

orcible Sodomy, a Felony of the First Degree and the crime of

1

orcible Sexual Abuse, a Felony of the Third Degree.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of convictions of Forcible

3odomy and Forcible Sexual Abuse and dismissal of those charges
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

and Technology Act, administered
the Utah State
Jgainst him, or inLibrary
theServices
alternative
a new by
trial
on Library.
those charges.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATE:1ENT OF THE FACTS

Among other witnesses, Marlene Harpole testified that on
July 5, 1977, she saw her daughter, Becky (age 4), her son, Kirk

(age 3) and two other children, Bryson (age 4) and Anson Jack (age 3;
by a house being built near her home (T.
testified that she saw a

~an

39-40).

Mrs. Harpole

bv the side of the house and

as if he and the children were talking.

i~

looked

Mrs. Harpole was about

two hundred feet from the man and could not make out his facial
features

(T. 40-41).

About fifteen minutes later, t1rs. Harpole

went over to the house being built to get her children.
testified that one of the children, Anson,
showed us his weenie.
yukky" (T. 43).

Mrs. HarpolE

told her, "that man

He let us feel it, and we tasted it and it ta:

Mrs. Harpole then went to the home of Mrs. Laurie

Jane Jack (the mother of Anson and Bryson) and told her what had
happened.

Mrs. Harpole then went home and got a piece of paper

and a pencil and with Mrs. Jack and the children went back over
to the house that was being built, where she wrote down the license
plate number of a red truck she had seen at the house earlier
(T.

43-45).

Mrs. Harpole testified that she saw two people standin;

around the truck, one of them being the man she had seen before
(T.

45).
Laurie Jane Jack testified that on July 5. 1977. at about

1:30 p.m. Marlene Harpole came to her house and tolJ her that the
children had an encounter with a man over at the house.

Mrs.
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Jack

:~en

called
53-5-'.)

~~t~ ~rs

to~d

her

t~e

children in and discussed the incident with them

~rs.

Jack then went over to the house under construction

Harpole and the children.
wh~ch

Mrs. Jack testified that Bryson

man it was (T. 55-56).

Mrs. Jack identified the

appellant as the man Brvson pointed out to her (T. 56).

Mrs. Jack

:'-..en cal"!.ed Russell Sanderson, a Salt Lake County Sheriff who lived
in

~er

neighborhood, and reported the incident to him.
Russell Sanderson testified that Mrs. Jack gave him a

oh~sical

description of a suspect, a vehicle description and a

license plate number (T. 67).

The following day, July 6, 1977, Sheriff

Sanderso~

"ent to the house under construction where he found the

appe~lant

and arrested

hi~

(T. 72).
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TESTI~-10NY OF MARLENE HARPOLE AND LAURIE JANE
JACK WAS H[ARSAY EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE
A~D ITS ADMISSION WAS A VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S
RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSERS UNDER THE SIXTH
AME~~NT OF TP.E UNITED STATES CO:lSTITUTION AND
UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

f

The trial court allowed the witness, Marlene Harpole, to
tes:ifv as to what the children told her about the alleged incident
IT

43).

The trial court also allowed the testimony of Laurie Jane

Jack as to what the children told her (T. 54) over the objections of
Jefense counsel

Clearlv, this testimony was hearsay.

Hearsay is
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testimony offered to prove facts of which the witness has no personal
knowledge, but which have been told to him by others.

The witness

is not testifying from his own knowledge or observation but is
acting as a conduit to relay that of others.

State v. Sibert, 6

Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388.
Although some courts discussed the matter under the
terminology res gestae, courts today recognize an exception to the
hearsay rule for certain statements made under the influence of a
startling event.

The two basic requirements of this exception to

the hearsay rule are discussed by Professor McCormick:
First, there must be some occurrence of event
sufficiently startling to render normal reflective
thought processes of an observer inoperative.
Second, the statement of the declarant must have
been a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence
or event and not the result of reflective thought.
McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, §297.
In Cromeenes v. San Pedro, Los Angeles and Salt Lake
Railroad Company, 37 Utah 475, 109 P.lO (1910) this Court discussed
this exception to the hearsay rule:
To bring the declarations of a party within the
doctrine of res gestae, they must be connected
with, and grow out of, the act or transaction
which is the subject matter of the inquiry
so as to form one continuous transaction, and must,
in some way, elucidate, qualify, or characterize the
act, and on a legal sense, be a part of it . . . .
the test of whether or not declarations are res
gestae is.
Where the facts talking through the
party, or the party's talk about the facts?
Instinctiveness is the requisite, and when
this exists the declarations are admissible.
37 Utah 490.
The basis for the admission of the declaration is its spontaneity
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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~he

excite~ent

Ea~rication

suspends the declarant's powers of reflection and

which leads to the vie1v that the declaration is reliable.

This exception to the hearsay rule is recognized in Rule
63 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which provides:
Evidence of a statement which is made other than
by a witness while testifying at the hearing
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is
hearsay evidence and inadmissable except:
(4) a statement (a) which the judge finds
was made while the declarant was perceiving
the event or condition which the statement
narrates, describes or explains, or (b) which
the judge finds was made while the declarant was
under the stress of a nervous excitement caused
by such perception .
The hearsay statements of Marlene Harpole and Laurie Jane Jack which
the trial court allowed were not made while the declarants, the
children, Anson and Bryson, were perceiving the event.

The state-

ments made by the children to Mrs. Harpole were made ten to fifteen
minutes after the alleged incident.

Nor was there any indication

that the children were under the stress of a nervous excitement caused

by such perception to allow the hearsay evidence to come in under
this exception.

In fact, Mrs. Jack had to call the children in

from play and at that point elicited the statements from them (T. 53).
In State v. Sanders, 27 Utah 2d 354, 495 P.2d 270 (1972)
this Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that a statement was
inadmissible as a spontaneous explanation where the conditions of
stress of a nervous excitement caused by such perception were absent.

496 P.2d at 274.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Langford v. State,

312 So.2d 65 (Alabama 1975),

Court considered a case quite similar to the one at hand.

the

The

defendant was convicted of abusing a girl under the age of twelve
years, in the attempt to have carnal knowledge of her.

The trial

court allowed the mother of the alleged victim to testify what the
child told the mother soon after the mother first saw her after the
alleged occurrence.

The Court ruled that the adMission of the

mother's testimony was improper as it did not come under the spontaneous exclamation exception:
Little fault can be found in an assumption that
the child was excited at the time of her statements
to her mother, apparently twenty or thirty minutes
after the alleged crime, but s•.1ch assumption could
be based solely upon a concept of usual natural
reactions to such an offense.
There was no effort
by the State to show her excitement, which could
have been easily shown, if there Has any.
He
are unwilling to state that the natural and normal
disposition of such victims under any and all
circumstances, including as in this case injury,
while being examined promptly thereafter by a
physician, is always sufficient to show an
extension for any substantial measured length
of time of excitement or instinctiveness in a
particular individual as distinguished from
deliberation.
This case, as bad as it is, does
not fall within any special category of rape or
sexual abuse of children that relieves the State
of the duty of showing by some evidence, if it can,
special circUMstances that warrant the application
of a special rule of inclusion, which is an exception
to a general rule of exclusion.
Our conclusion that the statements of the girl
do not Meet the test of soontaneitv does not
offend any principle that· such decision should
be largely left to the discretion of the trial
judge.
On the other hand, it finds support in the
fact that apparently neither the State nor the
trial court took the position that the evidence

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Nas admissible as constituting a part of the
res gestae or a spontaneous exclamation.
The
trial judge stated, "If it goes to a complaint
about the incident it is admissible.
If it
goes to something else I will sustain it.
I
will just have to hear it, and exclude it if
it is not proper.

The hearsay rule, which has long been recognized and respected
b·; '-:irtually every state,

is based on experience and grounded in the

notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be presented to the
triers of fact.

Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded

because they lack the indicia of reliability:

they are usually

not made under oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker
:,;ith the solemnity of his statements;

the declarant's word is not

subject to cross-examination; and he is not available in order that
his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the trier of fact.
Chambers v. :--!ississippi, 410 U.S.

298,

35 L. Ed.

2d 310, 311.

The Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the
witnesses against him is a fundamental right, essential to a fair
trial, and is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment.

A major reason underlying the Constitutional Confrontation

Rule is to give a defendant charged with a crime an opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses against him.
400, 13 L.Ed.

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.

2d 923, 85 S.Ct. 1065 (1965).

Appellant was denied his constitutional right to crossexamine the witnesses against him when the court admitted the hearsay
:est imon ·r of :-1ar lene Harpole and Laurie Jane Jack.

:--Irs. Harpole

testified as to what Anson Jack told her of the incident (T. 43).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The declarant, Anson, was not a witness, and could therefore not
be cross-examined as to his statement.
The only identification of appellant was by the witness,
Laurie Jane Jack and was a hearsay identification.

Laurie Jane Jack

testified that the day of the incident she asked Bryson Jack which
man had committed the offense, and Bryson pointed out appellant
(T. 55-56).

At the trial, Bryson could not identifv the appellant

Q.

[MR. MARSON)

Now, did your morn ask you about the

man?
A.
[BRYSON JACK)
said, "Yes."

Yes, she said, "Is that the man?"

I

MR. JOHNSTON:
Objection to that and request it to be
stricken, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Hell -

MR. JOHNSTON:

\.Jhat was said is hearsay.

THE COURT:
I think you ought to lay a foundation
as to identification, please.
MR. MARSON:
Your Honor, this witness cannot identify
the defendant.
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

(T.

31)

Since the statements of Marlene Harpole and Laurie Jane
Jack concerning what the children told them about the alleged incider
and the identification of appellant by Laurie Jane Jack were hearsay
statements and the statements do not meet the conditions which woulc
allow them to come in under the exception to the Hearsav Rule
63(4)(b), the statements were inadmissible as evidence

The adrnissi

of the hearsay statrnents was unconstitutional as it denied a?pellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WITNESS,
BRYSON JACK WAS COMPETENT TO TESTIFY.
Ctah Code Ann.

§78-24-2 (1953 as amended) provides:

The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(2) children under ten years of age, who
appear incapable of receiving just impressions
of the facts respecting which they are examined,
or of relating them truly.
In regard to testamentary capacity, it is admitted that a child of
any age can testify if they meet certain qualifications.

In State

v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965) the Court discussed
those qualifications:
\-.That is essential is that it appears that the child
has sufficient intelligence and maturity that she is
able to understand the questions put to her; that
she has some knowledge of the subject under inquiry
and the facts involved therein;
that she is able
to remember what happened; and that she has a sense
of moral duty to tell the truth.
Appellant submits that the witness, Bryson Jack, was not adequately
qualified as a witness and was not competent to testify.
incompetence

Bryson Jack's

as a witness appears from consideration of the whole of

his testimony.
On cross-examination, the witness, Bryson Jack, contradieted the testimonv he gave on direct examination saying what he
told the Court was not true

Q

Brvson, vou've told the Judge that you tasted
somebody's
w~enie.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A.

I know.

Q.

Now, that isn't true; is it, Bryson?

A.

Uh-uh.

Q.

It isn't true; is it?

A.

Uh-uh; not true.

Q.

It isn't true; is it, son?

A.

Uh-uh.

Q.

I have nothing further.

(T.

35)

And again, on recross-examination:
BY MR. JOHNSTON:

Q.

Bryson

A.

What?

Q.

--it's true, isn't it, that you didn't taste
the man's weenie?

MR. MARSON:
Your Honor, could I ask Mr. Johnston
to rephrase that question? I understand this is
cross-examination, but conceptually we're dealing
with a difficult type of question;
"It's true,
isn't it." If we could be rather straightforward
with this child I think it would be helpful.
THE COURT:

The objection is overruled.

Q.

(By Mr. Johnston)

A.

Uh-uh.

tm. MARSON:

That's true, isn't it?

Your Honor, I'd like to object again.

THE COURT:
The objection as to the form of the
question will be sustained.
MR. MARSON:
Thank you, Your Honor.
minute, Bryson.
Q.

(By Mr. Johnston)

Wait a

Bryson
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A.

\.Jhat?

Q.

--Becky didn't taste the weenie; did she?

A.

L"h-uh.

Q.

She didn't, now, did she, Bryson?

A.

:-lo.

MARSON
Your Honor, again, I wish he could
be straightfon.;ard.
I don't think the child
understands the two double negatives. He's
saving yes to the fact that she did.
~ffi.

THE COURT·

~or

Rephrase the question, please.

Q.

(By Mr. Johnston)

A.

\.Jhat?

Q.

--Becky didn't taste the weenie; did she?

A.

No.

(T.

Bryson--

37-38).

did Bryson appear capable of understanding some of the questions

put to him bv counsel:
(Bv Mr. Johnston)
church?

Q.

Bryson, do you go to

A.

Yes.

Q.

\.Jhat church do you go to?

A.

Go

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes.

Q.

\.Jhat religion are you a member of?

A.

Mv teacher.

Q

Your teacher?

A.

Yes.

down to the church.
Are you a member of a religion?
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Q.
Do vou know what religion you're a
member

of?

A.

No.

Q.

How often do you go to church, son?

A.

Just every day.

Q.

Every day?

A.

After school.

Q.

Every day after school?

A.

Yes.

(T. 34-35)

Or by the Court:
THE COURT:
Now, in addition to your morn talking
to you about telling the truth, has anybody else
talked to you about telling the truth?
BRYSON JACK:
THE COURT:
BRYSON JACK:

Yes.
And who might that be?
My morn.

(T. 19-20).

Appellant submits that the contradictory testimony of the
witness and his inability to understand questions put to him rendere:
the witness, Bryson Jack, incompetent to testify.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the admission of
the hearsay evidence and the ruling that Bryson Jack was competent
to testify was error and should result in a dismissal of the charges

- 12 -
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against him or in the alternative, a new trial on those charges.
Respectfully submitted,

BRUCE C. LUBECK
Attorney for Appellant
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